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Abstract
We examine the effects of political uncertainty surrounding the outcome of U.S. presi-
dential elections on financial market quality. We postulate those effects to depend on
a positive relation between political uncertainty and information asymmetry among in-
vestors, ambiguity about the quality of their information, or dispersion of their beliefs. We
find that market quality deteriorates (trading volume and various measures of liquidity
decrease) in the months leading up to those elections (when political uncertainty is likely
highest), but it improves (trading volume and liquidity increase) in the months afterwards.
These effects are more pronounced for more uncertain elections and more speculative, dif-
ficult to value stocks (small, high book-to-market, low beta, traded on NASDAQ, or in
less politically sensitive industries), but not for direct proxies of the market-wide extent of
information asymmetry and heterogeneity among market participants (accruals, analysts’
forecast dispersion, and forecast error). These findings provide the strongest support for
the predictions of the ambiguity hypothesis.
JEL Classification: D80; G0; G12; G14
Keywords: Political Uncertainty; Market Quality; Trading Volume; Liquidity; Price
Impact
Long before the appointed day [of a Presidential election]
arrives, the election becomes the greatest, and one might say
the only, affair occupying men’s minds. . .
– Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, 1848
1 Introduction
Political uncertainty matters. Many recent studies conjecture that uncertainty about
political outcomes has important effects on asset returns and corporate decisions.1 In this
paper, we provide novel evidence that political uncertainty significantly affects the quality
of the process of price formation in financial markets.
We study the uncertainty regarding the outcome of the U.S. Presidential elections. We
assume that political uncertainty is greater in the months prior to those elections (relative
to non-election periods) but is resolved once the outcome of the elections is determined.
Financial market quality refers to the ability of a market to price assets correctly, which
in turn crucially depends on efficient price discovery and liquidity. Both dimensions of
market quality, while difficult to measure, are typically related to transaction costs, speed
of execution, and price impact (O’Hara (1995); Pasquariello (2014) ). The empirical
microstructure literature has proposed numerous measures of market quality (e.g., see
Hasbrouck (2007)). We concentrate on trading volume, the fraction of zero returns, and
Roll’s price impact because of both their widespread use and their strong link with the
theoretical microstructure literature on the process of price formation in financial markets
in the presence of uncertainty (e.g., see Vives (2008) and Goyenko, Holden, and Trzcinka
(2009)).
We conjecture that so-defined political uncertainty may affect market quality via three
1e.g., see Pantzalis, Stangeland, and Turtle (2000), Bernhard and Leblang (2006), Bialkowski,
Gottschalk, and Wisniewski (2008), Durnev (2011), Bond and Goldstein (2012), Pástor and Veronesi
(2012), Julio and Yook (2012), Goodell and Vahamaa (2012), Belo, Gala, and Li (2013), Pástor and
Veronesi (Forthcoming), and Boutchkova, Durnev, Doshi, and Molchanov (Forthcoming).
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channels related to information asymmetry, ambiguity, and disagreement. A priori, po-
litical uncertainty has an unclear effect on market quality. In his seminal work, Miller
(1977) notes that “uncertainty, divergence in beliefs about a security’s value, and risk
go together.” Thus, uncertainty implies dispersion of beliefs among market participants,
which according to Varian (1985) can arise either because of differences in information
or differences in opinion (i.e., disagreement). Subsequent literature (e.g., Epstein and
Schneider (2008)) suggests that differences in information are either due to differences in
information quantity or information quality.
With the information asymmetry hypothesis we conjecture that political uncertainty,
as a source of fundamental uncertainty, may affect the information asymmetry between
informed and uninformed investors, or investors and firms. Numerous rational expecta-
tions equilibrium (REE) models since Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) illustrate this linkage.
Intuitively, greater fundamental uncertainty — e.g., before Presidential elections, when
political uncertainty is likely high — makes private fundamental information more valu-
able, thus increasing adverse selection risk. The opposite would then occur after those
elections. The effects of information asymmetry on market quality in REE models are
less clear. According to Wang (1994), greater information asymmetry leads to lower
trading volume as it decreases the informativeness of asset prices. However, informed
trading volume may also increase with political uncertainty if liquidity trading is exoge-
nous and inelastic, as in Kyle (1985). In addition, greater adverse selection risk may
increase market-makers’ inventory cost, leading to lower market liquidity — e.g., higher
bid-ask spreads (Ho and Stoll (1981), Amihud and Mendelson (1986)) or lower depth
(Kyle (1985)) — and consequently higher fraction of zero returns and Roll’s price impact.
With the ambiguity hypothesis we conjecture that greater political uncertainty may
lead to greater ambiguity about the quality of information available to market participants.
Standard REE models (e.g., Vives (1995a); Vives (1995b)) assume investors’ information
to be of known quality. Recent studies (e.g., Epstein and Schneider (2008); Ozsoylev and
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Werner (2011)) extend these models to incorporate ambiguity by allowing investors to have
a distribution of beliefs about the mean and/or variance of the fundamentals of the traded
asset. For instance, in the model of Ozsoylev and Werner (2011), greater fundamental
uncertainty distorts the quality (rather than the quantity) of investors’ information by
worsening the ambiguity of their prior beliefs about asset fundamentals. Faced with
greater such uncertainty, ambiguity-averse investors and arbitrageurs may choose to trade
less or not trade at all. Thus, in this setting trading volume and liquidity would decline
prior to U.S. elections — when both political uncertainty and ambiguity of information
quality are high — and improve afterwards, once the election outcome is determined.
With the disagreement hypothesis we conjecture that greater political uncertainty may
increase differences in opinion among market participants. In heterogeneous beliefs models
(e.g., Banerjee and Kremer (2010), Hong and Stein (2007)), greater fundamental uncer-
tainty increases disagreement among investors about the fundamental value of the traded
asset, leading them to trade more with one another, i.e., increasing equilibrium trading
volume. Thus, trading volume may first increase in the months preceding presidential
elections — when both political uncertainty and accompanying information heterogeneity
among market participants are likely high — and then decrease afterwards, when po-
litical uncertainty is resolved. However, according to Pasquariello and Vega (2007) and
Pasquariello and Vega (2009) more heterogeneously informed speculators may instead
trade more cautiously (i.e., less, rather than more) with their private information, leading
to deteriorating trading volume and market liquidity.
These three hypotheses make distinct predictions (summarized in Table 1) regarding
the impact of uncertainty on market quality. As noted earlier, we test these predictions by
using all U.S. presidential elections between 1927 and 2012 as a proxy for the time-varying
extent of political uncertainty over our sample period and investigate its effects on trading
volume, the fraction of zero returns, and Roll’s price impact. We find that trading volume
decreases in the months preceding presidential elections and increases in the months im-
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mediately following the elections. Popular measures of illiquidity continuously available
over our long sample period (Roll’s price impact (1927) and the fraction of zero returns
(1927) significantly increase in the months before and modestly decline in the months
after the elections. The effects of political uncertainty on market quality are larger in
correspondence with more uncertain elections (i.e., with smaller popular vote margin),
consistent with the notion that political uncertainty is higher prior to the elections and
dissipates once their outcome is determined.
Cross-sectional analysis provides further insights about the determinants of the effects
of political uncertainty on market quality. Within our hypotheses, we expect these effects
to be most pronounced for more “speculative” and difficult-to-value stocks (e.g., Baker
and Wurgler (2007); Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009)). Accordingly, we find political
uncertainty to have its greatest impact on the quality of the process of price formation
for smaller stocks, stocks with higher book-to-market, stocks with lower market beta, and
stocks traded on NASDAQ. In those cases, the estimated drop in trading volume and liq-
uidity prior to the elections and its subsequent increase afterwards are several times larger
than for stocks of larger firms and NYSE stocks, respectively, as predicted by the ambigu-
ity hypothesis. However, the estimated effects of political uncertainty on market quality
have the opposite sign for the least speculative firms. For instance, large firms’ trading
volume increases and liquidity improves prior to the elections and decline afterwards.
These dynamics are consistent with the predictions of the disagreement hypothesis and
suggest that political uncertainty may induce speculators to shift their trading activity to
the most liquid stocks by magnifying the dispersion of their beliefs prior to the elections.
Stocks that operate in politically sensitive industries (tobacco, guns and defense, alcohol,
utilities, natural resources, and mining; e.g., Hong and Kostovetsky (2010)) also experi-
ence a significantly lower pre-election drop in trading volume and a larger post-election
increase as compared to stocks in non-politically sensitive industries.
These findings provide the strongest — albeit only indirect — support for the pre-
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dictions of the ambiguity hypothesis. Time-varying ambiguity is elusive and difficult to
measure. Nonetheless, the literature has developed several, more direct proxies for the
(stock-level and market-wide) extent of information asymmetry and differences of opin-
ions among market participants: working capital accruals and changes in cash holdings
(Calomiris and Himmelberg (1997), Levy (2010)), the dispersion of analysts’ forecasts
(Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina (2002) and Scherbina (2004)) and analysts’ forecasts er-
ror (Lang and Lundholm (1996), Levy (2010)). However, our estimates of the interaction
of each of these proxies with the effects of political uncertainty on market quality yield
no support for the information asymmetry and disagreement hypotheses. In fact, the
estimates, although, not statistically significant, have the opposite sign from what the
information asymmetry and disagreement hypotheses predict.
Our paper is related to recent empirical and theoretical studies on presidential elec-
tions around the world and their effects on firm-level investment, stock returns, and return
volatility (e.g., Pantzalis, Stangeland, and Turtle (2000), Bernhard and Leblang (2006),
Durnev (2011), Bialkowski, Gottschalk, and Wisniewski (2008), Goodell and Vahamaa
(2012), Julio and Yook (2012), Pástor and Veronesi (2012), Pástor and Veronesi (Forth-
coming), Boutchkova, Durnev, Doshi, and Molchanov (Forthcoming)). For instance, Julio
and Yook (2012) document cycles in corporate investment in correspondence with the
timing of national elections in 48 countries between 1980 and 2005. Goodell and Va-
hamaa (2012) show that political uncertainty around U.S. presidential elections affects
option-implied stock market volatility insofar as the winner of the presidential elections
becomes more uncertain. Boutchkova, Durnev, Doshi, and Molchanov (Forthcoming)
show that this effect is stronger for firms operating in politically sensitive industries.
Pástor and Veronesi (2012) and Pástor and Veronesi (Forthcoming) develop a general
equilibrium model to show that government policy uncertainty and political uncertainty,
respectively, may have ambiguous effects on stock prices because of their effects on both
future cash flows and discount rates (e.g., by exposing stocks to an additional source of
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non-diversifiable risk). Relative to these studies, our focus is on the determinants and
implications of investors’ behavior for financial market quality when political uncertainty
is high.
In the rest of the paper, we proceed as follows. In Section 2 we further discuss our
notion of political uncertainty relative to the existing literature. We describe our data
and empirical design in Sections 3 and 4, respectively. We present our results in Section
5. Section 6 concludes.
2 Political Uncertainty
Within the political science literature, political uncertainty typically refers to the lack
of sureness or absence of strict determination in political life. As Dahl, Stinebrickner, et al.
(1963) notes, uncertainty appears to be an important characteristic of all political life.
Elections, wars, governmental processes, threats, and other political phenomena are all
inherently uncertain political occurrences (Cioffi (2008)). In this study, we define political
uncertainty as the uncertainty regarding the outcome of U.S. Presidential elections. We
concentrate on presidential elections because in developed countries with stable political
regimes, such as the United States, regularly scheduled Presidential elections are (exoge-
nous) political events that define who holds office. Therefore, the timing of Presidential
elections does not depend on economic conditions or business cycles.
One may argue that political uncertainty is merely a reflection of policy uncertainty.
These two forms of uncertainty, while related, use distinct features. Policy uncertainty
is the uncertainty regarding any government policies (monetary and fiscal policies) and
their impact on economic activity or financial markets (e.g., Pástor and Veronesi (2012),
Pástor and Veronesi (Forthcoming), Pasquariello (2014)). A popular index of economic
policy uncertainty is developed by Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2013) and is comprised
of news coverage about policy related economic uncertainty, tax code expiration, and
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analysts’ disagreement. Insofar as there may be uncertainty about the government policies
proposed by competing candidates for office, political uncertainty may also stem from
policy uncertainty. Political uncertainty however is broader in scope for it entails greater
uncertainty regarding the possible states of nature that can occur. In particular, political
uncertainty encompasses both uncertainty about the election outcome and uncertainty
about the policies that may ensue from that outcome.
Another important distinction is the one between political uncertainty and economic
uncertainty. Economic uncertainty is the uncertainty regarding the economic conditions
or the business cycles. Economic uncertainty may affect political uncertainty since during
periods of high economic uncertainty the uncertainty regarding who wins the Presidential
elections may increase. This raises the possibility that any investigation of the impact
of political uncertainty on market quality may be plagued by endogeneity concerns. For
instance, both market quality and political uncertainty may be amplified by economic
uncertainty surrounding downturns in economic activity or outright recessions. However,
as noted in the Introduction, in our study we make the important identification assump-
tion that, although being possibly state-dependent, political uncertainty is always higher
in the months leading to U.S. presidential elections and lower once their outcome is de-
termined. Of course, economic conditions may (and often do) affect political outcomes
as well. Nonetheless, given the above assumption, endogeneity concerns are mitigated by
our prior observation that the timing of U.S. presidential elections is exogenous to current
and expected economic uncertainty.
If, however, our identification assumption is not supported, then our results may
be driven by political business cycles (“election year economics”) rather than political
uncertainty. As Alesina (1988) notes, “social planners” and “representative consumers”
do not exist. Politicians are driven by their incentive to be re-elected (“office-motivated”
politicians; e.g., see Nordhaus (1975), Rogoff (1987)). Office-motivated politicians can
manipulate monetary and fiscal policy instruments to influence the level of economic
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activity and increase their chances of being re-elected. Under this scenario, our results may
merely reflect the peaks and troughs of the political business cycle. However, according
to Drazen (2001), there is much less hard evidence about the prevalence of “election-year
economics” in developed countries (and especially in the United States) than suggested
by both the aforementioned theoretical models and conventional wisdom. For instance,
Drazen (2001) (p. 76) observes that “although there is wide — but not universal —
agreement that aggregate economic conditions affect election outcomes in the United
States, there is significant disagreement about whether there is opportunistic manipulation
that can be observed in the macro data.” Thus, we argue that U.S. presidential elections




The U.S presidential elections are held every four years, the Tuesday between Novem-
ber 2nd and 8th. Traditionally, there have been two major political parties participating,
Democrats and Republicans.2 The candidates are nominated through a series of primary
elections and caucuses. This process however, is not part of the United States Constitu-
tion and instead, was created by the political parties over time. As a result, the exact
time that the nominees are selected is not pre-specified and in fact, has varied a lot across
elections. For instance, in the 1976 elections, the Republican’s party nominee was not
selected until the party’s national convention when the incumbent President, Gerald Ford,
narrowly defeated Ronald Reagan. Thus, we choose to study the effects of political uncer-
tainty over a fixed window of six months before (since May) and four months after (until
February) the actual election day.
2However, three main candidates ran for office in the elections of 1968, 1980, 1992, 1996 and 2000.
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We consider 22 U.S. presidential elections from 1928 until 2012. Table 2 shows sum-
mary characteristics of the presidential elections; incumbent president and party, winning
candidate and party, and popular vote margin. The 6 most uncertain elections according
to the popular vote margin are the elections of 1960, 1968, 1976, 1992, 2004 and 2012.
The data on U.S. presidential elections have been collected from CQPress3.
We conduct our analysis including the presidential elections of 2000 between George
W. Bush (R) and Al Gore (D). Since however, the uncertainty about the winner was
resolved in December 12th, 2000, we additionally test whether our results are robust to
the exclusion of the 2000 elections. The results are indeed robust [results not shown].
3.2 Measures of Market Quality
We measure financial market quality through trading activity, the fraction of zero
returns, and Roll’s price impact.
Trading activity is defined using raw and log turnover. For each individual stock i, we





where i indexes stocks and t indexes months. Vit is the total monthly share volume of
stock i, and Ni are the number of shares outstanding of stock i.
Table 3, panels A and B show the summary statistics for monthly turnover and returns
from 1926 to 2013 and subperiods. Turnover exhibits extreme positive skewness (64 in
1926-2013 period) and has a very fat tail (15379 kurtosis in 1926-2013)4. To correct for
3http://www.cqpress.com
4The extreme skewness (140.4 and 125.2) and kurtosis (44819 and 45230) in the subperiods 1966-1986
and 1997-2006 are driven by the October 1987 crash. The anomalous properties for both returns and
volume in the 1986-1987 period have been well documented in the empirical literature.
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Table 3, panel C, shows the transformed skewness and kurtosis, -0.26 and 3.43 respec-
tively, which match closely the skewness and kurtosis of a normal distribution, allowing
us to perform OLS regressions.
Several studies have documented that trading volume exhibits characteristics of non-
stationarity and a time-trend. Figure 1 shows the time series of monthly market turnover
where these two properties are evident. To address the issue of the time trend we use a
time trend control and refrain from using any de-trending techniques. Lo and Wang (2001)
apply several such techniques on the turnover time series and show that the characteristics
of the de-trended series vary across the de-trending methods. Thus, they conclude that
it is optimum to use the raw turnover.
To proxy liquidity, we use Roll (1984)’s impact and a measure developed in Lesmond,
Ogden, and Trzcinka (1999), the proportion of days with zero returns (zeros hereafter).






−Cov(∆Pt,∆Pt−1) when Cov(∆Pt,∆Pt−1) < 0
0 when Cov(∆Pt,∆Pt−1) ≥ 0
(3)
The use of zeros is very intuitive as stocks with lower liquidity are more likely to have zero
volume days and thus more likely to have nothing going on zero return days. Additionally,
stocks with higher transaction costs have less private information acquisition (because it
is more difficult to overcome higher transaction costs) and thus, even on positive volume
days, they are more likely to have no-information-revelation, zero return days.




(#of days with zero returns)
T
(4)
where T is the number of trading days in a month. Goyenko, Holden, and Trzcinka (2009)
show that zeros outperform other measures of liquidity both when using high frequency
data and daily/monthly data.
3.3 Financial Market Data
We obtain the data on market quality from the University of Chicago’s Center for
Research in Security Prices (CRSP) Monthly Master File. We use monthly data for all
the stocks listed on the NYSE, NASDAQ and AMEX from 1926 to 2013. NYSE and
AMEX stocks span the whole period from 1926 to 2013, but NASDAQ stocks enter the
sample in 1973 when it was first introduced. We include only common stocks (CRSP
share code 10 and 11) and as conventional, omit ADRs, SBIs, REITs, and closed-end
funds. We implement additional filters to exclude any outliers that may drive or distort
our results. Hence, we exclude stocks with zero trading or whose price is missing (or
is below $0.5). We also winsorize the data at the top and bottom 5% volume and 1%
returns. Additionally, we only include stocks that have been listed and actively traded in
either of the exchanges for at least 3 years.
Table 3 shows the number of firms in our sample. Overall, there are 18,810 unique
stocks for the period 1926-2013. In the last 7 years (since 2007), after the recent financial
crisis, there has been a significant drop in the number of firms that are listed on the
exchanges.
On the account of the well known double counting issue related to NASDAQ volume
(Atkins and Dyl (1997)) and the fact that the structure and capitalization differences
between NASDAQ and NYSE may have important implications for the measurement
and behavior of volume, most of the empirical literature analyzes the two exchanges
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separately. Particularly, the double counting issue arises because NASDAQ is primarily
a dealer market, whereas the NYSE is an auction market. For instance, when an investor
sells 100 shares of a firm x to a dealer, the dealer reports a 100-share transaction; when
another investor buys these 100 shares of firm x from the dealer, the dealer reports another
100-share transaction. The reported trading volume for firm x is 200 shares, when only
100 shares have been exchanged between the two investors. Thus, the reported trading
volume on the NASDAQ is overstated (Atkins and Dyl (1997)). For our purposes these
differences do not play a major role. Thus, in the main regression specification we do not
separate between the exchanges.
To measure the effects of the differences between the exchanges on market quality, we
run separate regressions for NYSE/AMEX and NASDAQ. Table 11 shows and section 5
discusses the results.
4 Empirical Design and Results
This section presents our main empirical findings related to financial market qual-
ity around election months. We begin with our primary test on the effects of the U.S.
Presidential Elections on market quality controlling for firm characteristics and economic
conditions. We also vary the empirical specification to test whether our results are ro-
bust to different specifications. We then test directly the information asymmetry and
disagreement hypotheses using various proxies for information asymmetry and differences
in opinion. Finally, we conduct a sub–sample analysis to examine how and if our results
are driven by firm characteristics.
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4.1 Market Quality around U.S. Presidential Elections
To quantify the impact of U.S. presidential elections on market quality we run the
following baseline panel data regression:




t + γDt + δTt + θ1Xit + θ2Ft + εit , (5)
where i indexes firms and t indexes months. The dependent variable, market quality,
is defined as either raw turnover, log(τ), the fraction of zero returns, Zerosit, or Roll’s





t are the months preceding the elections, from May until October, and M
+
t
are the months following the elections, starting from November until February (of the
following calendar year). For instance, consider the 2008 elections. M−t = 1 if t = May2008
but M−t = 0 if t = May2007 (the same applies for the aforementioned months). The
coefficients of the election dummies, β1 and β2, capture the change in the conditional
market quality in the months preceding and following the elections, controlling for firm
characteristics and economic conditions, Xit and Ft, that explain trading volume. To
control for the unconditional market quality we include a vector of month dummies, Dt.
Firm fixed effects are included and standard errors are clustered by firm throughout
the paper. We do additional tests using two-way clustering (both across firms and months)
and neither the qualitative nature nor the statistical significance of our results change [to
preserve space, results are not reported]. We do not cluster by year, as the consistency of
clustered standard errors comes from the large number of clusters (see Angrist and Pischke
(2008) and Wooldridge (2002)). Thus, including clustered standard errors by year will
distort our findings and any interpretations should be made with additional caution.
Trading volume exhibits a significant U–shaped time trend. Figure 1 shows the time
series of the end of month market turnover. Beginning in the 1920’s, turnover has a
steep decrease reaching its minimum during the 1950–1980’s. From the 1990’s, turnover
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exhibits a steep increase that peaks in 2008 and 2009. This upward trend is possibly
due to the elimination of fixed commissions in 1975 (Campbell, Grossman, and Wang
(1993)), the technological innovations such as online trading (Ahmed, Schneible, and
Stevens (2003)) and the increase in trading activity of institutional investors, especially
hedge funds (Fung and Hsieh (2006)). To control for the time trend, we include a time
trend dummy, T 2t . As Figure 1 depicts, the time trend is not linear. To account for the
non-linearity, we perform additional analysis including the cube of the time trend. The
sign of the coefficients does not change and the statistical significance increases with this
correction (results not shown).
The strong time trend along with the non-stationarity can constitute an important
problem when conducting statistical inference - it is particularly difficult to interpret a
t-statistic in the presence of a strong time trend. We however believe that refraining
from imposing a statistical structure outweighs the statistical cost of analyzing the raw
turnover. Additionally, due to the non-stationarity of turnover, we do not include year
fixed effects in our regressions.
As proposed by the empirical literature (e.g., Chordia, Huh, and Subrahmanyam
(2007), Hong and Stein (2007), Lo and Wang (2001)) on market quality we include several
firm level controls, Xit, that explain trading volume and zeros. We control for log market
capitalization and log price, the monthly standard deviation of returns and turnover, and
the sign of the preceding month returns.
We argue that since market capitalization and price are important drivers of stock
returns, they should also explain market quality. Specifically, larger firms, i.e., with higher
market capitalization, tend to have more diverse ownership and are more visible, which
can lead to higher trading volume. The log price captures the trading costs. The main
trading costs come from the bid-ask spreads that are discrete values and thus, inversely
related to the price levels. Therefore, we expect that, ceteris paribus, higher trading
volume should be positively related to the price levels. For a detailed analysis on the
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significance of log market capitalization and log price see Black (1976) and Banz (1981).
To control for market quality due to portfolio rebalancing needs we include a dummy
variable for past positive returns; the dummy variable is one if the return of the preceding
month is positive and zero otherwise. Trading volume in response to past returns is
predicted by the theoretical model of Hong and Stein (2007) and empirically suggested
as a control in Chordia, Huh, and Subrahmanyam (2007).
To capture the effects of the general economic conditions, Ft, we include as controls
the NBER recessions and the unemployment rate. We also include the Fama-French 3
factors and momentum using the same rationale as previously; since they are important
drivers of stock returns, they may also explain market quality. We obtain the data on the
FF 3 factors and momentum from the Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS) Fama
French factors file.
Table 4, and Figure 2 report the results for our baseline regression specification (equa-
tion 4). The first three columns of Table 4 report the regression coefficients of market
quality, i.e., log turnover, log(τ), the fraction of zero returns, Zeros, and Roll’s impact,
Roll, on the election month dummies without any controls but with firm FE and clustered
standard errors. The following columns add the market level controls and the firm level
controls. Figure shows the results of the main regression with controls and the 95% error
band.
Our central result is that turnover decreases in the months preceding the presidential
elections and increases modestly in the four months following the elections, as compared
to the turnover during an average non-election month. The month of August experiences
the highest decrease; monthly turnover decreases by 7% (the result is significant at the
0.1% level). The months following the elections show steady increase in turnover, with
January and February experiencing the highest increase (4.5% and 3.3%, respectively, at
the 0.1% level). Figure ?? shows graphically the monthly average change in turnover
during an average election months, starting from May of an election year until January
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following the election. The coefficients represent the change in turnover relative to the
average non-election month. The shaded areas represent 95% confidence intervals and the
changes are the β coefficients of the main regression specification.
The fraction of zero returns, Zeros, increases in the months prior to the elections.
The months following the elections experience a mixed behavior regarding the fraction of
zero returns, indicating that liquidity still decreases even after the election outcome has
been declared. The fraction of zero returns starts decreased long after the elections are
over (results not shown here). These results also indicate that liquidity may be affected
by policy uncertainty, which inevitably is high during the months following an election
outcome and until the new government is settled down. Figure 2b shows graphically the
monthly average change in zeros, starting from May of an election year until February
following the election. Similar results apply to Roll’s impact measure. The results of
Roll’s impact measure are qualitatively the same and are shown in Figure 2c.
Our main findings suggest that, for the average stock, the disagreement hypothesis
potentially, is rejected since its main prediction is higher trading volume during the months
prior to the elections. Both the information asymmetry and the ambiguity hypothesis
cannot clearly explain the post-election pattern of liquidity. The findings so far however,
are not sufficient to draw concrete inferences on the hypotheses. To address that we
perform additional tests, which we discuss in Section .
4.2 Identification Assumption
Having shown that market quality deteriorates in the months preceding the presi-
dential elections and improves in the months following the elections, we now deepen our
analysis by introducing variation in the degree of uncertainty across the elections. If our
main identification assumption holds, i.e., that political uncertainty is higher on average
in the months leading up to presidential elections and is resolved when the outcome of the
elections is declared, then the impact of political uncertainty on market quality should be
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more profound during more uncertain elections.
To incorporate the degree of election uncertainty, we split the election sample into two
sub-samples; uncertain and non-uncertain elections. We define uncertain elections based
on the popular vote margin; Table 2, column 6, shows the popular vote margin across the
U.S. presidential elections. The uncertain elections are the following six elections: 1960,
1968, 1976, 1992, 2004, and 2012.
Table 5 reports the results for the following regression specification:






t +γDt+δTt+θXit+θ2Ft+εit , (6)
where UnElt is a dummy that equals 1 if the election on year t is uncertain. We include
an interaction term between uncertain elections and the uncertainty election indicator. It
is not necessary however, since the indicator for the uncertain elections is zero whenever
the election month dummies, M−it and M
+
it , are zero.
Table 5 shows the results. The results on turnover support our identification hypoth-
esis. During uncertain elections turnover decreases more in the months preceding the
elections. In particular, the effect is more pronounced for August and October. In the
months following the uncertain elections, the increase in turnover is significant but not as
profound as it is in the months preceding the elections. Figure 8a shows the results for
turnover during uncertain elections as compared to non–uncertain elections.
Table 5 also reports the results on the liquidity measures during uncertain elections.
The fraction of zero returns decreases during uncertain elections. This result, combined
with the result about turnover, potentially, suggests that during uncertain elections in-
vestors re–balance their positions more as compared to non–uncertain elections. Figure
8b and 8c show graphically the results, reinforcing the possibility for rebalancing during
uncertain elections.
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5 Information Asymmetry and Disagreement Hypothe-
ses Test
To shed more light on the asymmetric information and disagreement hypotheses, and
since ambiguity is elusive and difficult to measure, we directly test these two hypotheses.
To proxy for information asymmetry we use two different types of variables, i.e., analysts’
forecast error and working capital accruals. We proxy disagreement with the dispersion
in the analysts’ forecasts.
5.1 Working Capital Accruals
The empirical literature on political uncertainty provides evidence of information
asymmetry. Lower investments and higher cash flows (Julio and Yook (2012)), higher
accounting conservatism (Dai and Ngo (2012)), and lower investment to price sensitivity
Durnev (2011) indicate that in the months prior to national elections the adverse selec-
tion and moral hazard problems worsen thus, leading to higher information asymmetry.
In order to directly test the information asymmetry hypothesis we employ working capi-
tal accruals (Calomiris and Himmelberg (1997), Levy (2010)) as a proxy for information
asymmetry.
We motivate this approach through existing literature that relates the working cap-
ital accruals to information asymmetry. Working capital accruals are associated with
earnings management (Burgstahler and Dichev (1997)). The theoretical models of Dye
(1988), and Trueman and Titman (1988) predict a positive relationship between earn-
ings management and information asymmetry. The literature finds empirical evidence for
this relationship as well (Richardson (2000)). Thus, we hypothesize that higher work-
ing capital accruals indicate potential earnings management which in turn implies higher
information asymmetry.
We recognize a potential endogeneity issue with this approach. During periods of
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high political uncertainty, managers may be managing earnings in order to provide more
conservative estimates rather than hide information from the market and investors. If
that is the case, increases in working capital accruals would indicate an effort to better
estimate future earnings rather than manipulation, i.e., adverse selection and moral haz-
ard. If managers increase working capital accruals in order to be ‘on the safe’ side, they
still provide less accurate information to the market and investors, leading possibly to
worsening market quality.
The baseline regression we run is the following,




t + γQt + δXit + εit , (7)
where i indexes firms and t indexes months. ∆(WC)it is the change in working capital,
Q− are the quarters preceding and Q+ are the quarters following the presidential elections,
and Xit are controls. Following the accounting literature, we choose the following controls:
log sales, property, plant and equipment, industry, size, leverage, accounts receivable, and
investment cycle.
An important drawback in the above specification is that the first quarter following
an election begins in October, i.e., during a month that the uncertainty has not yet been
resolved. We obtain the quarterly data from Standard Standard and Poor’s Compustat
North America files; they extend from 1966 to 2012.
Table 6 shows the results of the above regression. We find that working capital accruals
do not change significantly neither in the quarters preceding nor in the quarters following
the U.S. presidential elections. In fact, working capital accruals drop during the quarters
before and after the elections. We run this empirical specification including clustered
standard errors on the firm and quarter level, and including quarter and firm fixed effects.
We find no significance under any specification.
Our results so far do not support the information asymmetry hypothesis. This evi-
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dence however is not sufficient to confidently draw any conclusions. To strengthen our
understanding and address the potential endogeneity issues arising with this approach,
we next investigate information asymmetry using analysts’ forecast error as a proxy.
5.2 Analysts’ Forecast
The literature on analysts’ forecasts has identified the analysts’ absolute forecast error
as proxies for information asymmetry (Lang and Lundholm (1996) and Levy (2010))
and information heterogeneity (Pasquariello and Vega (2007) and Pasquariello and Vega
(2009)). In particular, Barron, Kim, Lim, and Stevens (1998) develop a model that
relates the properties of the analysts’ forecasts to their information environment. They
show that forecast error has two components; the idiosyncratic and common component.
The idiosyncratic component is driven by the private information that analysts rely on,
whereas the common error arises from the errors in the public information. They find
that the forecast dispersion reflects only the idiosyncratic error while the absolute forecast
error reflects primarily the common error.
Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina (2002) and Scherbina (2004) use the dispersion in the
analysts’ forecasts as a proxy for differences in opinion. Thus, we test the disagreement
hypothesis through the analysts’ forecasts.
Following the theoretical findings of Barron, Kim, Lim, and Stevens (1998), we define










where σ(Earnings Forecasts) is the standard deviation of the quarterly earnings forecasts,
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and Price is the quarter closing price. We obtain the data on earnings forecasts and the
dispersion of analysts’ beliefs from Thomson and Reuters I/B/E/S files, which extend
from 1975 to 2012; thus, we miss two elections: 1968 and 1972.
We investigate the following regression specification:




t + γQt + εit , (10)
where Yit is either the dispersion of the analysts’ forecasts or the absolute forecast error
(definitions are in eq. 7 and 8), and Q− are the quarters preceding and Q+ are the
quarters following the presidential elections. Table 7 shows the results of this regression
specification. Again, we find no statistically significant results. In fact, we notice that
both the measures experience a decrease rather than an increase in the quarters preceding
and following the elections (with the exception of the 3rd quarter, during which dispersion
increases). Of course, we cannot draw any conclusions from these effects as the coefficients
are not significant; that is, they are not estimated precisely.
The direct test of the information asymmetry and disagreement hypotheses provides
evidence against the two hypotheses, leading us to conclude that the ambiguity hypothesis
is more plausible.
6 Firm Characteristics
In this section we perform cross-sectional regressions based on several firm character-
istics such as size, book to market ratio, market β, stock exchange, and industry. We
begin first by examining the effect of political uncertainty on firms of different size, book
to market ratio, and market β. We separate the sample into deciles and then interact
the size, book–to–market, and β variable, respectively, with the election months. The
21
following regression specification describes our test:








where Charit ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 10} describes the decile that a firm belongs in terms of size,
book–to–market, or β. More specifically, Size = 1 refers to the smallest and Size = 10
the largest firms in our sample. Similarly for book–to–market and β. The coefficient of
the interaction term, β3, measures the differential effect of the size, book–to–market, or
β of a firm on market quality before and after elections. Tables 8, 9, and 10 show the
results.
Figure 4 shows the results graphically for the monthly turnover and Roll’s impact
(the zeros do not have statistical significance) across firms of different size. The pattern
that emerges is that larger firms prior to the elections experience an increase in trading
volume whereas after the elections, and in particular during December, a steep decrease.
The opposite applies for smaller firms. That is the average effect is driven by the smaller
firms.
Figure 5 shows the results graphically for the monthly turnover and Roll’s impact
(the zeros, again, do not have statistical significance and the Roll’s impact estimate must
be interpreted with caution since the standard errors are significant only on the 10%
level) across firms of different book–to–market ratio. The pattern that emerges is similar
to that of size. Firms with higher book–to–market ratios experience more pronounced
market quality effects, as compared to firms with low book–to–market ratios.
Figure 6 shows the respective above results for market the β on turnover and Roll’s
impact. Again, zeros do not have statistical significance and the Roll’s impact estimate
must be interpreted with caution since the standard errors are significant only on the 10%
level. Firms with low β experience the greater changes in turnover and liquidity before
the elections and have slower recovery afterwards, as compared to firms with high market
22
beta.
Within our hypotheses, we expect the effects on market quality of more “speculative”
and harder–to–value stocks to be more pronounced. Indeed, the results described above
reinforce this prior. Stocks with lower size, higher book–to–market ratios, and lower
beta experience the greatest impact on the quality of price formation. These results are
suggestive of the ambiguity hypothesis, as the above described stocks are the ones that
face the higher uncertainty regarding the quality of information. These characteristics
do not necessarily affect the quantity of information thus, implying a rejection of the
information asymmetry hypothesis.
Similar differences in the cross-section of stocks are also captured in the specification of
the trading exchange. That is, NASDAQ includes smaller cap and mostly growth stocks,
as compared to NYSE that includes larger and more established firms. This separation
additionally reinforces our claim regarding the quantity and quality of information. Table
11 and Figure 7 show the results. The effect on the market quality of the stocks traded on
NASDAQ is more pronounced, suggesting again the potential dominance of the ambiguity
hypothesis.
Next, we test whether firms in more politically sensitive industries are affected more
as compared to firm that operate in other industries. Motivated by Hong and Kostovet-
sky (2010), we define as politically sensitive industries the following industries: tobacco,
alcohol, guns, defense, utilities, and natural resources (mining and forestry). Table ??
shows the SIC codes for the industries and the Fama–French 48 industry code. To ex-
amine the effects of the politically sensitive industries on market quality, we define an
indicator variable PSI that is 1 if a stock belongs to a politically sensitive industry and
0 otherwise. Below is the regression specification.









The coefficient of the interaction term, β3, measures the differential effect of the industry
of a firm on market quality before and after elections. Table 13 and Figure 8 show the
results.
It is very interesting to note that the politically sensitive industries experience a lower
decline in trading volume prior to the elections and continue to have a very sharp decline
in December. The same pattern emerges regarding liquidity.
7 Conclusion
Our empirical analysis shows that political uncertainty has a significant impact on
financial market quality. In the months leading up to presidential elections, market quality
deteriorates; we find that trading volume (measured by log turnover) decreases during
the 5 months prior to the elections and increases in the 3 months following the elections.
The fraction of zero returns and Roll’s impact increase during the period preceding the
elections and decrease modestly long after the elections are over.
Such results can be explained by the increased ambiguity regarding information qual-
ity in the months preceding the elections (ambiguity hypothesis). Under the ambiguity
hypothesis, we expect the ambiguity of the quality of information available to investors
to increase with higher political uncertainty. The increased ambiguity, as shown in Oz-
soylev and Werner (2011), decreases expected trading volume and increases liquidity risk
(defined as the probability of illiquidity). After the elections, once political uncertainty is
resolved, the ambiguity decreases leading to higher trading volume and liquidity. Ambi-
guity hypothesis is reinforced by our cross-sectional results. Stocks with lower size, higher
book–to–market ratios, lower β, and the ones traded on NASDAQ (i.e., more speculative
and harder–to–evaluate stocks) suffer more prior to the elections and experience a slower
recovery afterwards.
We additionally provide evidence in favor of the ambiguity hypothesis by directly test-
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ing and rejecting the alternative hypotheses; information asymmetry and disagreement.
We do not directly test the ambiguity hypothesis as the current stage of the empirical and
theoretical literature does not provide good and widely accepted proxies for ambiguity. A
future avenue for our research however, is to identify and test proxies for ambiguity.
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Table 2: Election Characteristics
This Table reports summary characteristics of U.S. presidential elections since 1927 to 2012. The char-
acteristics we report are the year of elections, whether there was an incumbent President, the incumbent
party and the winner party, and the popular vote margin. The highlighted popular vote margins are the
top 7 we use in order to define uncertain elections.
Year Incumbent Incumbent Party Winner Party Margin
1928 Republican H. Hoover Republican 17.41%
1932 H. Hoover Republican F. Roosevelt Democratic 17.76%
1936 F. Roosevelt Democratic F. Roosevelt Democratic 24.26%
1940 F. Roosevelt Democratic F. Roosevelt Democratic 9.96%
1944 F. Roosevelt Democratic F. Roosevelt Democratic 7.50%
1948 Democratic H. Truman Democratic 4.48%
1952 Democratic D. Eisenhower Republican 10.85%
1956 D. Eisenhower Republican D. Eisenhower Republican 15.40%
1960 Republican J. Kennedy Democratic 0.17%
1964 Democratic L. Johnson Democratic 22.58%
1968 Democratic R. Nixon Republican 0.6%
1972 R. Nixon Republican R. Nixon Republican 23.16%
1976 Republican J. Carter Democratic 2.7%
1980 J. Carter Democratic R. Reagan Republican 9.74%
1984 R. Reagan Republican R. Reagan Republican 14.21%
1988 Republican G.H. Bush Republican 7.72%
1992 G.H.Bush Republican B. Clinton Democratic 5.56%
1996 B. Clinton Democratic B. Clinton Democratic 8.52%
2000 Democratic G.W. Bush Republican 0.51%
2004 G.W. Bush Republican G. W. Bush Republican 2.46%
2008 Republican B. Obama Democratic 7.21%
2012 B. Obama Democratic B. Obama Democratic 3.86%
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Table 3: Trading Volume Summary Statistics
This Table reports summary statistics of monthly percentage return, percentage turnover, and log
turnover. The data contain both NYSE and NASDAQ stocks, from 1927 to 2012 (for NASDAQ the
data begin in 1973). We include stocks with at least 3 years of consecutive observations. The summary
statistics are the mean, standard deviation (SD), skewness, kurtosis and the number of firms traded at
each period. The monthly turnover is monthly volume divided by shares outstanding.
Period Mean SD Skewness Kurtosis No. of Firms
Panel A: Monthly Return (%)
1926-2013 0.008 0.173 5.966 292.4 18180
1927-1947 0.011 0.184 4.083 56.886 1124
1948-1965 0.007 0.086 1.791 22.880 2367
1966-1986 0.014 0.147 2.426 32.400 8752
1987-1996 0.014 0.170 4.563 112.14 10295
1997-2006 0.016 0.202 4.300 81.521 9492
2007-2013 0.006 0.176 3.868 78.410 4964
Panel B: Monthly Turnover (%)
1926-2013 0.833 1.957 63.598 15379 18180
1927-1947 0.448 1.480 23.046 1001.4 1124
1948-1965 0.216 0.401 33.94 3539 2367
1966-1986 0.391 0.751 140.4 44819 8752
1987-1996 0.750 1.434 125.2 45230 10295
1997-2006 1.291 2.735 33.75 2688 9492
2007-2013 1.840 2.622 13.18 519.7 4964
Panel C: Log Monthly Turnover (%)
1926-2013 -1.065 1.388 -0.261 3.433 18180
1927-1947 -1.881 1.446 -0.652 3.682 1124
1948-1965 -2.081 1.033 -0.130 4.390 2367
1966-1986 -1.503 1.093 -0.313 3.954 8752
1987-1996 -0.997 1.300 -0.613 4.205 10295
1997-2006 -0.475 1.280 -0.449 3.754 9492
2007-2013 -0.048 1.306 -0.795 3.914 4964
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Table 4: Baseline Market Quality Regressions
This Table reports the results of the following regression:




t + γDt + δTt + θ1Xit + θ2Ft + εit ,
where M−t are the months preceding and M
+
t are the months following the U.S. presidential
elections, Dt are month dummies, and Xit and Ft are additional controls. We include firm fixed
effects and clustered standard errors (at the firm level). Xit controls are: NBER recessions,
unemployment rate, excess market return, FF 3 factors and momentum. Ft controls are: an
indicator for lagged positive returns, log(size) and log(price), volatility of turnover and returns.
log(τ) Zeros Roll log(τ) Zeros Roll
May− -0.036∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ -0.044∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ -0.003
(-9.60) (17.58) (5.08) (-12.31) (22.63) (-1.53)
June− -0.033∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.131∗∗∗ -0.054∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.094∗∗∗
(-9.60) (20.25) (79.22) (-15.77) (20.98) (49.32)
July− -0.053∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ -0.030∗∗∗ -0.039∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ -0.029∗∗∗
(-15.42) (11.89) (-15.98) (-11.37) (26.50) (-14.89)
Aug− -0.052∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗ -0.077∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.019 ∗∗∗
(-15.25) (14.15) (18.74) (-22.46) (26.70) (9.91)
Sep− -0.024∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.057∗∗∗ -0.033∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ -0.049∗∗∗
(-7.19) (14.03) (23.61) (-9.23) (29.46) (-22.24)
Oct− -0.083∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗ -0.070∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗
(-24.88) (30.26) (24.76) (-20.37) (47.96) (12.39)
Nov+ 0.010∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.002 -0.001 0.020∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗
(3.02) (12.59) (0.68) (-0.30) (35.70) (8.45)
Dec+ -0.002 0.002∗∗∗ -0.011∗∗∗ -0.024∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ -0.031∗∗∗
(-0.78) (4.47) (-6.90) (-7.46) (34.82) (-16.76)
Jan+ 0.052∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.127∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.205∗∗∗
(14.08) (4.94) (67.75) (11.84) (29.58) (81.14)
Feb+ 0.001 -0.002∗∗∗ 0.133∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.138∗∗∗
(0.28) (-4.15) (79.15) (8.65) (11.09) (65.43)
Intercept -2.424∗∗∗ 0.520∗∗∗ 0.205∗∗∗ -5.426∗∗∗ 0.792∗∗∗ 0.160∗∗∗
(-98.80) (72.01) (20.58) (-74.39) (83.38) (6.11)
Controls No No No Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 2867696 3,139,809 3,139,809 2,469,068 2,472,048 2,472,048
Adj. R2 0.110 0.077 0.033 0.256 0.304 0.053
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 5: Turnover and Liquidity - Uncertain Elections
This Table reports the results of the following regression:






t + γDt + δTt + θXit + θ2Ft + εit ,
where M−t are the months preceding and M
+
t are the months following the U.S. presidential elections, Mt
are month dummies, and Xit and Ft are additional controls. We include firm fixed effects and clustered
standard errors (at a firm level). We include the uncertain election indicator, UnElect.
log(τ) Zeros Roll log(τ) Zeros Roll
May− -0.008 0.022∗∗∗ -0.047∗∗∗ Uncertain May− -0.085∗∗∗ -0.023∗∗∗ 0.132∗∗∗
(-1.62) (28.80) (-16.55) (-12.35) (-22.20) (40.93)
June− -0.026∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗ Uncertain June− -0.054∗∗∗ -0.033∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗
(-5.60) (34.69) (18.26) (-7.79) (-32.58) (37.24)
July− 0.003 0.029∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗ Uncertain July− -0.106∗∗∗ -0.039∗∗∗ -0.239∗∗∗
(0.59) (39.62) (40.39) (-15.50) (-37.41) (-71.96)
Aug− -0.034∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ -0.050∗∗∗ Uncertain Aug− -0.114∗∗∗ -0.035∗∗∗ 0.142∗∗∗
(-7.66) (38.33) (-21.24) (-16.69) (-35.21) (42.56)
Sep− -0.027∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ -0.041∗∗∗ Uncertain Sep− -0.047∗∗∗ -0.035∗∗∗ 0.039 ∗∗∗
(-5.81) (40.15) (-16.94) (-6.95) (-34.52) (12.24)
Oct− -0.023∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ 0.079∗∗∗ Uncertain Oct− -0.147∗∗∗ -0.034∗∗∗ -0.102∗∗∗
(-5.13) (49.31) (26.12) (-22.32) (-33.87) (-29.13)
Nov+ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ -0.043∗∗∗ Uncertain Nov+ -0.068∗∗∗ -0.029∗∗∗ 0.178∗∗∗
(4.69) (35.67) (-18.49) (-10.45) (-28.54) (52.69)
Dec+ -0.014∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗ -0.001 Uncertain Dec+ -0.031∗∗∗ -0.036∗∗∗ -0.034∗∗∗
(-3.38) (42.02) (-0.51) (-4.83) (-34.93) (-10.82)
Jan+ 0.053∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 0.176∗∗∗ Uncertain Jan+ -0.077∗∗∗ -0.019∗∗∗ -0.079∗∗∗
(11.66) (32.43) (60.20) (-11.79) (-20.41) (-23.87)
Feb+ 0.046∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.180∗∗∗ Uncertain Feb+ -0.089∗∗∗ -0.036∗∗∗ -0.045∗∗∗
(9.86) (25.55) (70.02) (-13.36) (-35.35) (-11.70)
Intercept -5.215∗∗∗ 0.927∗∗∗ 0.194∗∗∗
(-74.69) (110.25) (8.68)
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 2,683,743 2,687,061 2.687,061
Adj. R2 0.261 0.254 0.039
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes
Month Dummies Yes Yes Yes
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 6: Information Asymmetry: Accruals
This Table reports the results of the following regression:




it + γQit + δXit + εit ,
where Q−it are the quarters preceding and Q
+
it are the quarters following the U.S. presidential elections,
Qit are quarter dummies, and Xit are controls.
∆(Working Capital) ∆(Cash) ∆(Working Capital) ∆(Cash)
Quarter 1− 2.049 4.573 -0.873 -3.234
(0.82) (0.56) (-0.35) (-0.53)
Quarter 2− -14.809 ∗∗∗ -26.304 ∗∗ -11.893 ∗∗ -17.566 ∗∗
(-4.47) (-2.91) (-3.16) (-3.28)
Quarter 3− 2.269 6.265 3.165 0.906
(0.86) (0.90) (1.15) (0.23)
Quarter 4− -1.464 6.200 -2.004 -0.815
(-0.50) (0.67) (-0.70) (-0.17)
Quarter 1+ 6.748 ∗ -14.998 7.171 -6.795
(2.16) (-1.58) (1.80) (-1.50)
Quarter 2+ -1.625 -10.802 ∗ -1.186 -4.244
(-0.54) (-2.00) (-0.35) (-0.93)
Intercept 9.960 25.851 ∗∗∗ 7.153 10.051 ∗
(1.85) (3.62) (1.02) (2.01)
Controls No No Yes Yes
Obs. 347,261 151,115 213,906 83,183
Adj. R2 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.001
Firm FE & Quarter Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster s.e. firm Yes Yes Yes Yes
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 7: Analysts’ Forecasts Dispersion and Forecast Error
This Table reports the results of the following regres-
sion:




it + γQit + εit ,
where Yit is either the dispersion in the analysts’
forecasts or the absolute forecast error. Specification
similar to Table 6 applies.
(1) (2)
Dispersion |Forecast Error|
Quarter 1− 0.031 0.659
(0.29) (0.25)
Quarter 2− -1.500 -4.672
(-0.73) (-0.98)
Quarter 3− 0.108 -3.715
(0.46) (-0.76)
Quarter 4− -0.780 -21.492
(-1.54) (-1.14)
Quarter 1+ -0.305 -1.153
(-1.59) (-0.39)





Adj. R2 0.00 -0.00
Firm FE & Quarter Dummies Yes Yes
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 8: Turnover and Liquidity: Firm Characteristics - Size
This Table reports the results of the following regression:






t Sizeit + β4Sizeit + γDt + δTt + θ1Xit + θ2Ft + εit ,
where Sizeit ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 10} describes the decile to which a firm belongs. M−t are the months preceding
and M+t are the months following the U.S. presidential elections, Mt are month dummies, and Xit and
Ft are additional controls. We include firm fixed effects and clustered standard errors (at a firm level).
log(τ) Zeros Roll log(τ) Zeros Roll
May− -0.07 ∗∗∗ 0.016 ∗∗∗ -0.055 ∗∗∗ Size × May− 0.004 ∗∗∗ 0.000 ∗∗ 0.011 ∗∗∗
(-8.64) (12.76) (-12.56) (3.96) (-3.03) (19.35)
June− -0.171 ∗∗∗ 0.015 ∗∗∗ -0.013 ∗∗ Size × June− 0.021 ∗∗∗ -0.001 ∗∗∗ 0.017 ∗∗∗
(-20.91) (12.29) (-3.28) (19.08) (-4.00) (33.01)
July− -0.173 ∗∗∗ 0.011 ∗∗∗ 0.018 ∗∗∗ Size × July− 0.022 ∗∗∗ 0.000 ∗∗ -0.003 ∗∗∗
(-21.09) (8.51) (4.29) (20.35) (2.87) (-4.82)
Aug− -0.125 ∗∗∗ 0.01 ∗∗∗ -0.086 ∗∗∗ Size × Aug− 0.007 ∗∗∗ 0.000 ∗ 0.017 ∗∗∗
(-15.17) (8.28) (-20.97) (6.54) (2.37) (27.35)
Sep− -0.125 ∗∗∗ 0.011 ∗∗∗ -0.18 ∗∗∗ Size × Sep− 0.013 ∗∗∗ 0.001 ∗∗∗ 0.027 ∗∗∗
(-15.10) (8.40) (-37.96) (11.96) (5.60) (37.58)
Oct− -0.152 ∗∗∗ 0.019 ∗∗∗ 0.053 ∗∗∗ Size × Oct− 0.012 ∗∗∗ 0.001 ∗∗∗ -0.003 ∗∗∗
(-18.72) (14.86) (13.43) (11.17) (4.71) (-5.54)
Nov+ 0.028 ∗∗∗ 0.013 ∗∗∗ 0.074 ∗∗∗ Size × Nov+ -0.006 ∗∗∗ 0.001 ∗∗∗ -0.006 ∗∗∗
(3.39) (9.67) (17.72) (-5.90) (3.69) (-10.65)
Dec+ 0.244 ∗∗∗ 0.015 ∗∗∗ 0.062 ∗∗∗ Size × Dec+ -0.046 ∗∗∗ 0 ∗ -0.013 ∗∗∗
(30.49) (11.46) (15.87) (-42.42) (2.56) (-24.12)
Jan+ -0.003 0.007 ∗∗∗ 0.065 ∗∗∗ Size × Jan+ 0.004 ∗∗∗ 0.001 ∗∗∗ 0.013 ∗∗∗
(-0.36) (5.83) (14.20) (3.31) (8.57) (21.62)
Feb+ -0.048 ∗∗∗ 0.000 0.098 ∗∗∗ Size × Feb+ 0.009 ∗∗∗ 0.001 ∗∗∗ 0.011 ∗∗∗
(-5.91) (0.13) (23.42) (8.77) (7.85) (18.00)
Intercept -3.661 ∗∗∗ 0.609 ∗∗∗ 0.133 ∗∗∗
(-37.54) (65.73) (4.85)
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 2,683,743 2,687,061 2.687,061
Adj. R2 0.280 0.295 0.037
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes
Month Dummies Yes Yes Yes
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 9: Turnover and Liquidity: Firm Characteristics - Book to Market
This Table reports the results of the following regression:






t BMit + β4BMit + γDt + δTt + θ1Xit + θ2Ft + εit ,
where BMit ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 10} describes the book to market decile to which a firm belongs. M−t are
the months preceding and M+t are the months following the U.S. presidential elections, Mt are month
dummies, and Xit and Ft are additional controls. We include firm fixed effects and clustered standard
errors (at a firm level).
log(τ) Zeros Roll log(τ) Zeros Roll
May− -0.042 ∗∗∗ 0.015 ∗∗∗ 0.092 ∗∗∗ BM × May− -0.396 ∗∗ -0.004 0.032
(-7.61) (19.05) (24.89) (-3.14) (-0.19) (0.67)
June− -0.031 ∗∗∗ 0.009 ∗∗∗ 0.170 ∗∗ BM × June− -0.515 0.037 0.141
(-6.00) (11.48) (66.36) (-1.76) (1.28) (1.96)
July− -0.035 ∗∗∗ 0.016 ∗∗∗ 0.002 ∗∗∗ BM × July− -0.039 0.025 -0.052 ∗∗∗
(-6.64) (21.34) (0.89) (-0.40) (1.63) (-6.36)
Aug− -0.092 ∗∗∗ 0.012 ∗∗∗ 0.071 ∗∗∗ BM × Aug− -0.136 ∗∗∗ -0.001 -0.045 ∗∗
(-18.27) (17.58) (26.65) (-6.89) (-0.17) (-2.59)
Sep− -0.011 ∗ 0.018 ∗∗∗ 0.110 ∗∗∗ BM × Sep− -0.316 0.047* ∗ -0.167
(-2.02) (24.05) (35.18) (-0.90) (2.44) (-1.27)
Oct− -0.067 ∗∗∗ 0.029 ∗∗∗ -0.069 ∗∗∗ BM × Oct− -0.192 ∗∗∗ 0.001 0.040
(-12.00) (37.54) (-20.63) (-3.40) (0.24) (1.86)
Nov+ -0.045 ∗∗∗ 0.021 ∗∗∗ -0.008 ∗∗ BM × Nov+ -0.256 ∗ 0.002 0.090
(-7.09) (25.47) (-2.98) (-2.41) (0.26) (1.57)
Dec+ -0.027 ∗∗∗ 0.021 ∗∗∗ -0.052 ∗∗∗ BM × Dec+ -0.057 -0.015 -0.092
(-4.98) (26.84) (-19.31) (-0.40) (-0.62) (-1.52)
Jan+ -0.007 0.018 ∗∗∗ 0.157 ∗∗∗ BM × Jan+ -0.148 ∗ -0.013 ∗∗ 0.032
(-1.22) (23.77) (54.07) (-2.47) (-3.00) (1.93)
Feb+ 0.007 0.013 0.168 ∗∗∗ BM × Feb+ -1.159 -0.078 0.426
(1.23) (15.56) (54.62) (-1.42) (-1.88) (1.85)
Intercept -4.886 ∗∗∗ 0.756 ∗∗∗ 0.982 ∗∗∗
(-40.18) (50.66) (24.22)
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 836,057 836,292 836,292
Adj. R2 0.319 0.413 0.053
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes
Month Dummies Yes Yes Yes
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 10: Turnover and Liquidity: Firm Characteristics - Market Beta
This Table reports the results of the following regression:






t Betait + β4Betait + γDt + δTt + θ1Xit + θ2Ft + εit ,
where Betait ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 10} describes the market beta decile to which a firm belongs. M−t are the months
preceding and M+t are the months following the U.S. presidential elections, Mt are month dummies, and
Xit and Ft are additional controls. We include firm fixed effects and clustered standard errors (at a firm
level).
log(τ) Zeros Roll log(τ) Zeros Roll
May− -0.066 ∗∗∗ 0.009* ∗∗∗ 0.006 Beta × May− 0.004 ∗∗ 0.001 ∗∗∗ 0.001
(-10.24) (9.28) (1.41) (3.25) (4.66) (0.84)
June− -0.062 ∗∗∗ 0.009 ∗∗∗ 0.099 ∗∗ Beta × June− 0.003 ∗ 0.001 ∗∗∗ -0.001 ∗
(-9.77) (8.72) (26.34) (2.16) (3.46) (-2.33)
July− -0.051 ∗∗∗ 0.011 ∗∗∗ -0.021 ∗∗∗ Beta × July− 0.002 0.001 ∗∗ 0.004 ∗∗∗
(-7.93) (10.86) (-4.81) (1.38) (2.96) (5.15)
Aug− -0.111 ∗∗∗ 0.012 ∗∗∗ 0.023 ∗∗∗ Beta × Aug− 0.005 ∗∗∗ 0.000 -0.002 ∗
(-17.07) (12.34) (5.95) (4.37) (0.66) (-2.53)
Sep− -0.073 ∗∗∗ 0.016 ∗∗∗ -0.019 ∗∗∗ Beta × Sep− 0.005 ∗∗∗ 0.000 -0.001
(-10.99) (15.81) (-4.15) (4.27) (0.34) (-1.33)
Oct− -0.111 ∗∗∗ 0.023 ∗∗∗ 0.020 ∗∗∗ Beta × Oct− 0.005 ∗∗∗ 0.000 0.002 ∗∗∗
(-17.01) (23.43) (4.89) (4.25) (0.19) (3.62)
Nov+ -0.034 ∗∗∗ 0.016 ∗∗∗ 0.027 ∗∗∗ Beta × Nov+ 0.005 ∗∗∗ 0.000 0.002 ∗∗
(-5.32) (15.90) (6.54) (4.25) (0.54) (2.62)
Dec+ -0.077 ∗∗∗ 0.022 ∗∗∗ -0.024 ∗∗∗ Beta × Dec+ 0.010 ∗∗∗ -0.001 0.001
(-12.37) (21.49) (-5.87) (8.80) (-3.95) (1.08)
Jan+ 0.029 ∗∗∗ 0.016 ∗∗∗ 0.137 ∗∗∗ Beta × Jan+ -0.002 -0.000 0.001
(4.66) (16.90) (33.22) (-1.80) (-0.44) (1.94)
Feb+ 0.022 ∗∗∗ 0.005 ∗∗∗ 0.150 ∗∗∗ Beta × Feb+ -0.003 ∗∗ 0.001 ∗∗∗ 0.002 ∗∗∗
(3.58) (4.66) (38.62) (-2.69) (3.70) (3.33)
Intercept -4.669*** ∗∗∗ 0.678*** ∗∗∗ 0.180 ∗∗∗
(-66.67) (80.33) (7.79)
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 2,627,946 2,630,689 2,630,689
Adj. R2 0.277 0.297 0.036
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes
Month Dummies Yes Yes Yes
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 11: Market Quality Regression on NYSE/AMEX and NASDAQ
This Table reports the results of the following regression:




t + γDt + δTt + θ1Xit + θ2Ft + εit ,
where M−t are the months preceding and M
+
t are the months following the U.S. pres-
idential elections, Dt are month dummies, and Xit and Ft are additional controls. We
include firm fixed effects and clustered standard errors (at a firm level).
Nasdaq NYSE
log(τ) Zeros Roll log(τ) Zeros Roll
May− -0.060∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ -0.002 -0.033∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗
(-10.42) (27.37) (-0.46) (-8.14) (8.23) (7.58)
Jun− -0.091∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.068∗∗∗ -0.012∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗
(-16.80) (22.67) (22.52) (-3.21) (9.37) (41.00)
Jul− -0.102∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ -0.027∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗
(-18.34) (26.72) (-10.30) (2.82) (13.94) (14.94)
Aug− -0.122∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ -0.064∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗
(-22.83) (20.02) (9.32) (-16.56) (14.98) (6.68)
Sep− -0.064∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ -0.025∗∗∗ -0.032∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ -0.001
(-11.47) (26.27) (-7.43) (-7.85) (19.59) (-0.34)
Oct− -0.091∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ -0.036∗∗∗ -0.072∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.107∗∗∗
(-16.53) (35.65) (-13.20) (-18.19) (28.32) (30.17)
Nov− -0.025∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗ -0.003 0.015∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗∗
(-4.57) (28.63) (12.91) (-0.84) (20.67) (18.12)
Dec+ -0.023∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ -0.002 -0.018∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ -0.048∗∗∗
(-4.44) (28.60) (-0.82) (-4.96) (22.90) (-19.34)
Jan+ 0.017∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.139∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.199∗∗∗
(2.87) (24.04) (38.66) (4.62) (20.56) (72.25)
Feb+ 0.008 0.017∗∗∗ 0.103∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.233∗∗∗
(1.31) (18.83) (33.48) (3.29) (7.19) (86.43)
Intercept -4.817∗∗∗ 1.212∗∗∗ 1.330∗∗∗ -3.880∗∗∗ 0.574∗∗∗ -0.027
(-52.39) (83.36) (55.39) (-35.99) (69.56) (-0.74)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 1238596 1241312 1241312 1037975 1038321 1038321
Adj. (R2) 0.190 0.383 0.031 0.457 0.271 0.075
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 12: Politically Sensitive Industries: SIC Codes
This Table reports the politically sensitive industries, their SIC codes and Fama-
French 48 Industry codes.
Industry SIC Codes Fama-French
Tobacco 2100-2199 5













Table 13: Turnover and Liquidity: Firm Characteristics - Industries
This Table reports the results of the following regression:






t PSIit + β4PSIit + γDt + δTt + θ1Xit + θ2Ft + εit ,
where PSIit is an indicator variable that describes whether a stock belongs to a politically sensitive
industry. The remaining specification is as usual.
log(τ) Zeros Roll log(τ) Zeros Roll
May− -0.047 ∗∗∗ 0.012 ∗∗∗ 0.012 ∗∗∗ PSI × May− 0.016 -0.000 -0.006
(-13.29) (22.19) (5.29) (1.56) (-0.23) (-0.93)
June− -0.052 ∗∗∗ 0.011 ∗∗∗ 0.09 ∗∗∗ PSI × June− 0.035 ∗∗ 0.001 -0.001
(-15.55) (21.11) (48.52) (3.17) (0.67) (-0.16)
July− -0.045 ∗∗∗ 0.013 ∗∗∗ -0.004 ∗ PSI × July− 0.033 ∗∗ 0.002 0.085 ∗∗∗
(-13.34) (24.07) (-2.14) (2.80) (1.15) (10.56)
Aug− -0.086 ∗∗∗ 0.012 ∗∗∗ 0.015 ∗∗∗ PSI × Aug− 0.017 0.003 -0.031 ∗∗∗
(-25.69) (24.00) (8.39) (1.61) (1.62) (-4.62)
Sep− -0.049 ∗∗∗ 0.016 ∗∗∗ -0.022 ∗∗∗ PSI × Sep− 0.035 ∗∗ -0.001 -0.028 ∗∗∗
(-14.06) (29.28) (-9.82) (3.26) (-0.41) (-3.70)
Oct− -0.088 ∗∗∗ 0.022 ∗∗∗ 0.031 ∗∗∗ PSI × Oct− 0.029 ∗∗ 0.003 0.058 ∗∗∗
(-25.91) (42.46) (14.01) (2.65) (1.46) (8.71)
Nov+ -0.009 ∗∗ 0.015 ∗∗∗ 0.034 ∗∗∗ PSI × Nov+ 0.026 ∗ -0.006 ∗∗∗ 0.033 ∗∗∗
(-2.72) (28.34) (17.96) (2.48) (-3.31) (4.65)
Dec+ -0.023 ∗∗∗ 0.017 ∗∗∗ -0.016 ∗∗∗ PSI × Dec+ -0.047 ∗∗∗ -0.002 -0.009
(-7.37) (31.21) (-8.77) (-4.74) (-1.24) (-1.75)
Jan+ 0.018 ∗∗∗ 0.015 ∗∗∗ 0.14 ∗∗∗ PSI × Jan+ -0.001 0.004 ∗ 0.02 ∗∗
(4.96) (26.67) (61.81) (-0.05) (2.31) (3.14)
Feb+ 0.009 ∗ 0.006 ∗∗∗ 0.158 ∗∗∗ PSI × Feb+ -0.009 0.004 ∗ 0.048 ∗∗∗
(2.47) (9.80) (75.78) (-0.85) (2.02) (7.44)
Intercept -5.205 ∗∗∗ 0.88 ∗∗∗ 0.079 ∗∗∗
(-74.19) (100.62) (3.85)
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 2,683,743 2,687,061 2.687,061
Adj. R2 0.280 0.295 0.037
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes
Month Dummies Yes Yes Yes
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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